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It is generally assumed that when making categorization judgments the cognitive system
learns to focus on stimuli features that are relevant for making an accurate judgment.
This is a key feature of hybrid categorization systems, which selectively weight the
use of exemplar- and rule-based processes. In contrast, Hahn et al. (2010) have
shown that people cannot help but pay attention to exemplar similarity, even when
doing so leads to classification errors. This paper tests, through a series of computer
simulations, whether a hybrid categorization model developed in the ACT-R cognitive
architecture (by Anderson and Betz, 2001) can account for the Hahn et al. dataset.
This model implements Nosofsky and Palmeri’s (1997) exemplar-based random walk
model as its exemplar route, and combines it with an implementation of Nosofsky et al.
(1994) rule-based model RULEX. A thorough search of the model’s parameter space
showed that while the presence of an exemplar-similarity effect on response times
was associated with classification errors it was possible to fit both measures to the
observed data for an unsupervised version of the task (i.e., in which no feedback on
accuracy was given). Difficulties arose when the model was applied to a supervised
version of the task in which explicit feedback on accuracy was given. Modeling
results show that the exemplar-similarity effect is diminished by feedback as the model
learns to avoid the error-prone exemplar-route, taking instead the accurate rule-route.
In contrast to the model, Hahn et al. found that people continue to exhibit robust
exemplar-similarity effects even when given feedback. This work highlights a challenge
for understanding how and why people combine rules and exemplars when making
categorization decisions.
Keywords: categorization, rules, similarity, computational model, hybrid models
INTRODUCTION
A classic distinction in the categorization literature is between categorization by rule as opposed
to categorization by exemplar similarity (Nosofsky et al., 1994; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997).
More recently, these two alternatives have been fused in hybrid systems of the categorization
process. Hybrid models combine rule and exemplar processing within a single framework (e.g.,
Vandierendonck, 1995; Palmeri, 1997; Ashby et al., 1998; Erickson and Kruschke, 1998; Anderson
and Betz, 2001). These models vary in the way rules and exemplars are related. For example,
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rule- and exemplar-routes might be subject to global or local,
trial-by-trial competition, or the outputs of each route might
be blended into a composite response. A core assumption of
virtually all these hybrid models, however, is that the relative
influence of rule and exemplar processes is influenced by their
utility. In other words, sensitivity to exemplar-similarity is subject
to strategic control and the system learns to focus on stimuli
dimensions that lead to accurate classification judgments.
In contrast to this prevailing theoretical view, Hahn et al.
(2010) have shown that people cannot help but pay attention to
exemplar similarity, even when doing so leads to classification
error (see also, von Helversen et al., 2013). Across a series
of experiments, participants were explicitly provided with a
perfectly predictive classification rule along with a series of
positive examples to illustrate the rule. After viewing the training
items, participants were asked to classify novel test items that
either complied with or violated the rule. Half of the items
had high similarity to the training items, and half had low
similarity to the training items. In contrast to previous work
on similarity and explicit rule use (e.g., Allen and Brooks,
1991; Regehr and Brooks, 1995; Lacroix et al., 2005; Folstein
and van Petten, 2010; but see also Folstein et al., 2008),
the similarity manipulation depended entirely on features that
were not mentioned in the rule and which were consequently
entirely irrelevant to correct classification. Furthermore, given
the design of the test set, responding based on similarity alone
would lead to chance performance (i.e., accuracy levels of
50%).
Even though the similarity manipulation in Hahn et al.’s
(2010) study was orthogonal to category membership, robust
effects of exemplar similarity were observed. Specifically,
participants’ correct responses to rule-compliant test items that
were also similar to the items viewed at training were faster
than those to equally compliant items that were not. These
effects could not be explained by a simple failure of participants
to apply the given rule because participants made very few
categorization errors (mean error-rates were between 5 and 9%).
In other words, participants were sensitive to exemplar-similarity
effects while making very few classification errors, and these
similarity effects persisted over the course of the experiment
(see Hahn et al., section 6). This opens up important questions
about how rules and exemplars were being combined when
making categorization decisions in Hahn et al.’s rule application
task.
In this paper, we conduct a detailed computational exploration
of Anderson and Betz’s (2001) hybrid model of categorization
by applying it to Hahn et al.’s (2010) rule application task.
Anderson and Betz’s model implements two well-known models
of categorization, Nosofsky and Palmeri’s (1997) exemplar based
random walk model (EBRW) and Nosofsky et al. (1994) rule-
plus-exception (RULEX) model, within the general cognitive
architecture of ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004). As a result, it
provides a computationally explicit means for capturing the
interaction between exemplar-based and rule-based classification
within a single system. It is comprehensive and explicitly defined
in all aspects of the task, from feature uptake through to
production of a response. The model also provides quantitative
predictions of both errors and response times, and, in this regard,
remains (to the best of our knowledge) the only hybrid rule-
exemplar model in the literature to do so. Finally, it has been
validated (see Anderson and Betz, 2001) in its match to both
EBRW and RULEX predictions, as well as in its ability to capture
data indicative of rule-exemplar interaction from the studies of
Erickson and Kruschke (1998).
Given this, we consider whether the model can be made to fit
the observed data from Hahn et al.’s (2010) studies, both in terms
of response time and error-rate. This is not a forgone conclusion
because, as we shall explain below, the use of exemplar-based
processes tends to result in response errors. We therefore use the
model to systematically explore the response patterns produced
by various blends of rule-based and exemplar-based processes
and whether a fit to data can be achieved.
In the following, we first describe our implementation of
Anderson and Betz’s (2001) model in the current version of
the ACT-R software (ACT-R 6, Anderson et al., 2004) and then
evaluate the model against data from Hahn et al.’s (2010) rule
application task. We end by discussing the implications of the
results of this modeling study for hybrid categorization models
more generally.
MODEL
The implementations of the both the rule-route (RULEX) and
exemplar-route (EBRW) relied on the mechanisms within the
ACT-R declarative memory module (see Anderson et al., 2004
for details). In ACT-R, declarative knowledge is represented in
the form of chunks. Chunks were used to represent both the
explicit categorization rule used by the rule-route and the rule-
compliant training exemplars that were used by the exemplar-
route. We shall first describe in more detail how these two routes
in the model were implemented before describing how the model
choose between routes when making categorization decisions.
A central component of the model is that both routes
rely on the retrieval of chunks from declarative memory. The
rule-route in the model determined category membership by
first attempting to retrieve a chunk representing the explicit
categorization rule. If this was retrieved, the test items were
compared to the rule and if they matched all of the rule relevant
features a positive response was given; if a feature did not match
the rule specification then a negative response was given. As will
be explained in detail below, rule retrieval occasionally failed
because the chunk’s activation was below the retrieval threshold.
On these rare occasions the model made a random (guessing)
response.
The exemplar-route in the model made response judgments
by attempting to retrieve chunks representing rule-compliant
exemplars (which were studied during training). If an exemplar
was successfully retrieved, then the model made a positive
response (because all training items were compliant with the
rule). If a training exemplar could not be retrieved (because the
activation of the chunks where all below the retrieval threshold),
then a negative response was made, indicating that the test item
was not a member of the category.
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The main difference between these two routes then is that rule-
route uses only the rule-relevant features to cue the retrieval of
the rule from declarative memory, whereas the exemplar-route
uses all of the features of the test item to cue the retrieval of past
training exemplars from declarative memory. In other words, the
rule-route of this model is functionally equivalent to an exemplar
model that gives weighted attention only to the diagnostically
relevant stimuli features.
The above sets out the core ideas for how the two routes in
the model work. To give a more detailed understanding, we next
expand on the mechanisms of the ACT-R declarative memory
module used by the model.
As outlined above, each route relied on the retrieval of chunks
from declarative memory. The activation of a chunk i (Ai) is
defined as
Ai = Bi +
∑
l
PMli + ε (activation equation)
where, Bi is the base-level activation of the chunk i, PMli is a
partial matching score that computes the similarity of chunk i to
the current test item l (which is vital for the exemplar-route), and
ε adds noise to the system.
The base-level activation gives a temporary boost in activation
to a chunk after it is retrieved from memory. This reflects the
general idea that chunks used recently and frequently are more
likely to be needed again in the future and the rate of base-level
learning of a chunk is based on the rational analysis of Anderson
and Schooler (1991). It is given by the equation
Bi = ln
( n∑
j = 1
t−dj
)
(base-level learning equation)
where, n is the number of presentations for chunk i, t is the time
since the jth presentation, and d is a decay parameter (which is
set to the default value of 0.5, as a value that has emerged as
appropriate over many applications, see Anderson et al., 2004).
This means that over successive trials chunks that are used often
have their activation strengthened allowing them to be retrieved
more rapidly on future trials. This is particularly pertinent to the
rule-route in the model: there is only a single chunk representing
the rule, and so its activation is strengthened over consecutive
trials in which it is used. The same also applies to the exemplar
route but to a lesser extent since there are more exemplars in
memory that could be potentially retrieved. How then does the
model decide which exemplar to retrieve?
The partial matching component of the activation equation
is critical to the exemplar-route as it allows for gradation
in exemplar similarity between a test item and the training
exemplars stored in declarative memory. Without it, the
difference between high- and low- similarity items cannot be
captured. The matching score in the activation equation is
a sum computed over all of the dimensions of the retrieval
request from the test item. The match scale P reflects the
weight given to a dimension, and this was set to the default
value of 1 (we discuss the implications of differential weighting
in detail below). The match similarities Mli determine the
similarity between the feature in the retrieval specification and
the corresponding dimension of the exemplars in memory. In the
reported simulations, each match increased activation1 by 1 and
each mismatch reduced activation by −1. To give an example,
the stimuli used in Hahn et al. (2010) were defined along six
feature dimensions. Suppose a test item matched on four of the
six features with a training exemplar, the partial matching score
would therefore be 2 (i.e., 4 − 2). In this way, high similarity
test items, which by design had more features overlapping with
the training exemplars, would have higher match scores than low
similarity test items, which shared fewer features with the training
exemplars.
Finally, we consider how activation values determine the
likelihood and duration of chunk retrievals from declarative
memory. In ACT-R, the probability that the activation of chunk
is greater than a threshold τ is given by the following equation:
Pi = 11+ e−(Ai−τ)/s (probability of retrieval equation)
where s controls the noise in the activation levels. In the reported
simulations the retrieval threshold τ was set to 0 (ACT-R default
value). If a chunk is successfully retrieved, the activation of the
chunk also determines how quickly it is retrieved. The time to
retrieve the chunk is given as
Ti = Fe−Ai (latency of retrieval equation)
where F is a latency factor, which was set to 1 (ACT-R default
value).
Choosing between Routes
We next describe how the model decided which route to use when
making a categorization decision using the ACT-R procedural
memory system. The Anderson and Betz (2001) model assumes
that categorization judgments are made on a trial-by-trial basis
by choosing the route–either rule-route or exemplar-route–that
has the greatest expected utility. Anderson and Betz define utility
as a trade-off function between the probability P that the route
would be expected to lead to a correct judgment and the expected
time cost C required to reach that judgment, such that the utility
U of route i is,
Ui = PiG− Ci + ε (production utility equation)
where G is a constant that reflects the value of the objective
(which can be thought of as a maximum time investment to
achieve the goal) and ε represents a noise parameter.
The route with the greatest utility is used to make a
categorization judgment on a trial-by-trial basis. However,
because utility estimates are noisy, over many trials the aggregate
output of the model will reflect a blending of the rule-route
and exemplar-route responses. But as we shall show in the next
section, it is also possible to systematically vary the utility values
of each route so as to bias the model to favor one route over
1Partial matching in ACT-R is usually only used to penalize the activation of items
that do not fully match the retrieval request so the default value is 0; in contrast,
by using a match of 1 we give an activation boost for matches. We consider the
implications of this parameter choice in the discussion below.
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the other (by changing the probability P that the route would be
expected to lead to a correct judgment).
A further benefit of the ACT-R framework is that it gives
the modeler the choice to either use constant utility values or
use dynamic utility values that are updated based on experience
(i.e., utility learning). As we shall explain in more detail below,
we use this utility learning mechanism to evaluate a supervised
version of the model. In this supervised version of the model,
where utility learning is enabled, the estimated utility of a route
is updated after every time it is used. This is done by updating
the probability P that the route is expected to lead to a correct
judgment:
P = Successes
(Successes+ Failures) (probability of success equation)
where successes is a count representing the frequency of
positively rewarded responses attributed to the route (i.e.,
correct responses) and failures is a count of negatively rewarded
responses (i.e., error responses). In the unsupervised version of
the model this utility learning mechanism was disabled.
MODELING EXPERIMENT
We evaluate both a supervised and an unsupervised version of
the model against data from Hahn et al.’s (2010) study. In these
studies, participants were first informed of the relevant rule for
category membership: the simple rule used in the two studies
that we model specified three necessary and sufficient features
for category membership (e.g., “is an A if it has an upside-
down triangle at the sides, a cross in the center, and a curly
line at the top”). After being told this rule, participants were
shown 12 instances of rule-compliant items, three times each.
Figure 1 gives an illustration of two rule-compliant items from
this experiment.
FIGURE 1 | Examples of the material used in Hahn et al. (2010). Example
(A) is a high-similarity rule compliant item and example (B) is a low-similarity
compliant item. The rule states that an object “is an A if it has an upside-down
triangle at the sides, a cross in the center, and a curly line at the top.”
Analogously, the model represented the rule in declarative
memory, and was presented with the same training items. These
training exemplars were stored in declarative memory for later
retrieval by the exemplar route. The model encoded all of the
stimulus features, assuming an overall visual encoding time of
555 ms to encode each item.
After viewing the training items, the model, like the
participants, was given 96 previously unseen test items to classify.
Test items were presented over four blocks of 24 trials; we
maintain this for the model to facilitate comparison. Following
categorization, test items were not added to declarative memory.
Thus, the exemplar-route relied entirely on the recall of items
viewed at training (a modeling decision which we return to
below).
As indicated above, Hahn et al.’s (2010) studies were designed
such that the manipulation of similarity was orthogonal to
category membership. Specifically, half of the test items complied
with the rule, and half violated it. At the same time, half of
the test items were high in similarity to the training exemplars
that participants viewed at the start of the experiment, and half
were low in similarity to these training exemplars. The degree
of similarity between training and test items was determined by
the number of irrelevant features that items had in common (i.e.,
features that were not mentioned in the rule). Figure 1 gives
an example of what these stimuli looked like, showing a high-
similarity rule-compliant item (a) and a low-similarity compliant
item (b). In Hahn et al.’s experiments, each test item was unique
and different to the training exemplars. High-similarity test items
had two rule irrelevant features (e.g., the Body and the Antenna
of the stimuli) that matched the features seen in one third
of the training exemplars. In the case of the example shown
in Figure 1A, the Body is a circular shape and the Antenna
extensions are squares. In contrast, low-similarity test items had
values for the same rule irrelevant features that were never seen
in the training exemplars. In the case of the example shown in
Figure 1B, the Body is a square shape and the Antenna extensions
are triangles. These shapes were never used in the training
exemplars for these rule irrelevant features. (Please see Appendix
of Hahn et al., for a complete logical description of all 12 training
exemplars and 96 test items used in these experiments).
To evaluate the model, we systematically varied the utility of
the exemplar-route so that it would be selected over the rule-
route on 0–100% of trials (in increments of 10%). In other words,
rather than letting the model learn route utilities we simply
explored the range of possibilities directly. Exploring this aspect
of the parameter space allowed us to quantify the relationship
between the size of any response time difference between high-
and low-similarity items and the presence of classification errors.
Both error rates and response time differences are directly
related to the core theoretical assumptions of the model, in
that, given the nature of the test items, systematic errors arise
only through the use of the exemplar route, as do the response
time differences between high- and low-similarity exemplars. The
rule has no exceptions, so always leads to correct classification,
whereas, by design, exemplar similarity is orthogonal to category
membership, so that exclusive use of the exemplar route would
lead to chance performance of 50% accuracy. By the same token,
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the rule is blind to similarity (as it focusses only on the rule
relevant features) so its use cannot give rise to exemplar similarity
effects. As consequence, correcting an excessive number of total
errors means that the exemplar route must have been used on
proportionally fewer trials; however, reducing the relative usage
of the exemplar route necessarily reduces any effect of similarity
on reaction time data. These two aspects of the data might not be
trivial to satisfy. In other words, it is an open question whether
the model can be made to simultaneously fit the data along these
two measures.
In our exploration of the parameter space, we first sought
to fit an unsupervised version of the model to data from a
version of the experiment in which participants did not receive
feedback on the accuracy of their categorization judgments
(Experiment 1 in Hahn et al., 2010). Following this, we compared
the performance of a supervised version of the model to data from
a version of the experiment in which participants received explicit
feedback after each trial on the accuracy of their categorization
judgment (Experiment 3 from Hahn et al.). To compare model
and experimental results, we simulated a population of ‘model
participants.’ This approach was necessary because the model’s
behavior is stochastic, and multiple model runs were necessary to
obtain reliable estimates of error rates. The model was run over
the experimental procedure 50 times and performance averaged
across independent runs.
RESULTS
Unsupervised Model
The left panel of Figure 2 plots the difference in reaction time
for correct responses to high- and low-similarity compliant items
against total number of classification errors. The figure shows the
strategy space of the model: Each circular data point represents
increasing use of the exemplar-route relative to the rule-route
(from 0 to 100%, in increments of 10%). For example, the left-
most data point in the figure (dark red circular data point)
shows the model’s performance when the rule-route was used
exclusively. The model made only two errors on average (across
98 trials) but there was also a very small difference in response
times (response times were on average only 5-ms faster for high-
similarity items than for low-similarity items). With increasing
use of the exemplar-route (moving left-to-right through the
circular data points in the figure), the difference in response times
between high- and low-similarity items increased. Critically, this
increase in exemplar-similarity effect was associated with an
increase in response errors. For example, the right-most data
point in the figure (blue circular data point) shows the model’s
performance when it exclusively used the exemplar-route: many
response errors were made (48 errors across 98 trials) but there
was a relatively large difference in response times (response
times were 199-ms faster for high-similarity items than for low-
similarity items).
Figure 2 also shows the human data from Hahn et al. (2010)
Experiment 1 (star data point). Considering the overall number
of errors heavily constrains the fit of the model to the human
data because even a modest increase in the relative use of the
exemplar-route is associated with an increase in classification
errors. It can be seen in the figure that the model fits both the
error rate and reaction time data from Experiment 1 in Hahn et al.
when the exemplar-route is used on 10% of trials (red circular
data point). When the model used the exemplar-route on 10% of
trials it made very few response errors (7 errors across 98 trials,
which is consistent with the error-rate found in Experiment 1
of Hahn et al.). There was also a difference in response times to
rule compliant items (response times were 46-ms faster for high-
similarity items than for low-similarity items, which is consistent
with the 62-ms difference reported in Experiment 1 of Hahn
et al.). These findings suggest that given a thorough sweep of the
model’s parameter space (systematically exploring the relative use
of exemplar-route over the rule-route), it is broadly possible to fit
both the error-rate and reaction time data from Experiment 1 in
Hahn et al.
We next report on a detailed assessment of the performance
of the best fitting 10% exemplar-route model and compare that
to the observed human data from Hahn et al. (2010). Figure 3
(left panel) shows the distribution of errors found in Experiment
1 of Hahn et al. (represented in the figure by the star data points)
and the distribution of errors made by the unsupervised 10%
exemplar-route model (represented in the figure by the bars).
The core data to capture are that participants made significantly
fewer errors when categorizing high-similarity compliant items
than low-similarity compliant items. The model fails to capture
the effect of similarity on error-rates: There was an equal number
of errors made for high- and low-similarity compliant items. In
contrast, the model generated differences between the high- and
low- similarity non-compliant items, whereas the human data
contains no significant differences.
Finally, Figure 2 makes clear that when reliance on the
exemplar-route was increased the frequency of errors increased
substantially relative to those observed in the human data. Fitting
the number of errors therefore heavily constrained the model.
We next consider how well the 10% exemplar-route model
fit the absolute reaction time data. Figure 4 shows the average
response time for high- and low-similarity compliant items across
each block of trials in the experiment. As expected, the model
demonstrated a speed-up in reaction time over successive blocks
of trials because of the strengthening of chunks in memory
(i.e., the base-level learning equation). More importantly, like
the human data, the exemplar-similarity effect predicted by the
model did not diminish over time and was still present in the final
block.
Supervised Model
Experiment 3 in Hahn et al. (2010) used the same design and
materials as the first study but additionally gave participants
feedback at the end of each trial on whether their response had
been correct or not. Despite giving this additional feedback, Hahn
et al. found an exemplar-similarity effect on response times:
Participants were again faster at categorizing high-similarity
compliant items than low-similarity compliant items.
We ran the model through a supervised version of Hahn
et al.’s experimental procedure. To do this we enabled ACT-R’s
utility learning mechanism and gave the model explicit feedback
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FIGURE 2 | Data plots of the difference in reaction time to rule-compliant items (the exemplar similarity effect) against number of classification
errors. Circular data points represent modeled data. Each circular data point shows the results of running the model with a different weighting of exemplar-route
relative to rule-route (from 0 to 100% in increments of 10%). The star data points represent human data are from Hahn et al. (2010) Experiment 1 (left panel,
unsupervised) and Experiment 3 (right panel, supervised). Note that in the human data the similarity effect on latencies increases from Experiment 1 to Experiment 3,
while the error rate goes down.
FIGURE 3 | Data plots of error-rates across experimental conditions. Bars represent modeled data. The model was initially biased to use the exemplar-route
on 10% of trials. The star data points represent the human data are from Hahn et al. (2010) Experiment 1 (left panel, unsupervised) and Experiment 3 (right panel,
supervised).
on its categorization accuracy after each trial. As before, we
systematically varied the initial utility of the exemplar-route so
that it would be selected over the rule-route on 0–100% of trials
(in increments of 10%). Note that a crucial difference here is
that after each trial, the model updated the estimate of a route’s
probability of success based on feedback (i.e., whether a correct
or incorrect response had been made). This was done by using
the probability of success equation (see above for details). Every
correct response increased the probability of success estimate for
a route, making it more likely to be selected on future trials. In
contrast, every incorrect response decreased the probability of
success estimate of a route, making it less likely to be selected on
future trials.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows for the supervised version
of the model the difference in reaction times for high- and
low-similarity items against classification errors. As before, each
model data point represents an increase in the initial use of
the exemplar-route relative to the rule-route. Comparing these
two panels, for almost every parameter value of the model,
the supervised model (right panel) made fewer classification
errors than the unsupervised model (left panel). For example,
considering the 50% exemplar-route model (green circle), we
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FIGURE 4 | Data plots of response times for high- and low-similarity rule-compliant across block. The model was initially biased to use the exemplar-route
on 10% of trials. Human data are from Hahn et al. (2010) Experiment 1 (left panel, unsupervised) and Experiment 3 (right panel, supervised).
see that the supervised model made 15 errors whereas the
unsupervised model made 26 errors. Both models started out
identical; only the supervised model learnt over time to avoid
the error-prone exemplar-route and so made fewer errors.
This strategic disfavoring of the exemplar-route necessarily
diminished the size of the exemplar similarity effect in the
response time data. For example, the 50% exemplar-model
showed a 135-ms exemplar similarity effect when run as an
unsupervised model. When the same model was run as a
supervised model, the exemplar similarity effects decreased
to 95-ms. This general pattern is seen across the parameter
space of the model (with the obvious exception of the 100%
exemplar-route model).
We next consider whether the supervised model can fit both
the reaction time and error-rate data from Experiment 3 of Hahn
et al. (2010). It can be seen in the right panel of Figure 2 that
across the parameter space of the model (i.e., varying the initial
use of the exemplar-route relative to the rule-route), the model
cannot fit both the observed reaction time and error-rate data
from Experiment 3 of Hahn et al. (star data point in right panel
of Figure 2).
In terms of error-rate data, the 10% exemplar-route model
(red circle) provided a good fit to the human data: errors
were made on four trials (out of 96) for both model and data.
Interestingly, the unsupervised 10% exemplar-route model also
provided the best fit to the data from Experiment 1 of Hahn
et al. (2010). Because of feedback, the supervised model made
fewer errors than the unsupervised model, and this was consistent
with the observed differences between Experiments 1 and 3 of
Hahn et al.
While the supervised model fit the error data well, there was a
poor fit to the reaction time data: the model showed a difference
of only 34-ms between high- and low-similarity items, whereas
the data from Experiment 3 of Hahn et al. (2010) showed a
114-ms difference. That is, the model seems to under-predict the
size of the exemplar similarity effect on reaction time given the
observed low rate of classification errors. To understand why
this is, Figure 4 shows the average response time for high- and
low-similarity compliant items across each block of trials. For
the model, the difference in reaction times between high- and
low-similarity items decreased over each block of trials. This is
because the model was learning with experience to avoid the
error-prone exemplar-route, and this diminished the exemplar
similarity effect. In contrast, the data from Experiment 3 of
Hahn et al. shows a robust exemplar similarity effects, even in
the last block of trials, and no evidence for block by similarity
interactions. This points to a fundamental failure of the model to
fit the data.
MODELING ALTERNATIVES
In any modeling enterprise, choices must be made. Before
moving on to the general implications of the results presented,
we examine some of the modeling assumptions that we made
and the extent to which they may be crucial to our results.
Three assumptions warrant closer scrutiny: the parameters used
to calculate match scores in the model, the decision not to store
classified test items in memory, and the allocation of attention to
the different stimulus dimensions.
Match Scoring
We noted above that when calculating partial match scores the
ACT-R default value for matches is zero. Partial matching is
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usually used to penalize the activation of items that do not
fully match the retrieval request; in contrast, by using a match
score of 1 we give an activation boost for matches. Similarity
values are a parameter of the model that can be set by the
modeler along with the scale on which they are defined. The
Anderson and Betz (2001) implementation of the EBRW used the
default which amounts to the city block metric as a measure of
distance. This is a departure from Nosofsky and Palmeri’s (1997)
original EBRW which used a Euclidean distance, with distances
converted to similarities via an exponential decay function as
standard in Nosofky’s Generalized Context Model (Nosofsky,
1986; Nosofsky, 1988). The immediate question of interest is
the extent to which such differences in choice of similarity
measure will impact model performance. As Anderson and Betz
demonstrate, their use of the city block metric does not prevent
them from fitting Nosofsky and Palmeri’s (1997, Experiment 1)
data; and our metric is a simple linear transformation of
Anderson and Betz’s city block metric2. More fundamentally,
however, the extent to which a change of similarity metric can
alter model performance depends on the nature of the items
set. The item set of Hahn et al. (2010) is carefully balanced by
design. Recall that the critical comparisons are between high-
and low- similarity test items, where ‘high’ and ‘low’ similarity
are defined relative to the training items. By design, each of the
test items in the high similarity and low similarity categories,
respectively, has the same number of matching/mismatching
features to all items in the training set as every other test item
in its condition (see Appendix). Any monotonic transform of
this space, whether it be linear or non-linear (such as Nosofsky
and Palmeri’s metric), will simply serve to scale the differences
between test items without changing their individual rank order.
In other words, Nosofsky and Palmeri’s metric will accentuate the
difference between the closest and the further distances due to
the exponential decay function, enhancing the difference between
high similarity and low similarity test items. Change of metric
will accentuate or diminish the magnitude of the similarity effect
in terms of latency differences. However, the ultimate failure of
the model does not lie with its inability to produce appropriate
latency differences, nor with its ability to do so while matching the
overall error rates seen in the human data: it does both of those
things just fine. What the model falls down on is fundamental
qualitative properties: (1) it generates a difference in errors on
high- and low-similarity items for non-compliant items, but this
similarity effect is not generated for compliant items – which
is the opposite of the human behavior; (2) the similarity effect
diminishes by necessity once feedback is introduced; and (3) the
latency difference in the human data is bigger in the feedback
condition even though the errors are lower, a qualitative shift
the model cannot generate (at least using the same parameters
across both tasks). These problems arise from the interaction of
the fundamental design characteristic of the model, namely that
route selection is governed by route utility, and the nature of
the specific stimulus set in which exemplar similarity is entirely
2Specifically, our match function equals 2× the distance + the total number of
features; that is, the possible values 0,−1,−2,−3,−4,−5,−6 are replaced with 3,
2, 1, 0,−1,−2,−3.
orthogonal to category membership. The details of the scale
factor applied by a specific similarity metric are irrelevant to this
problem.
Exemplar Storage
We also assumed that only training exemplars were stored
and used for forming classification judgments. However, many
exemplar theories (e.g., Logan, 1988; Nosofsky and Palmeri,
1997) assume that exemplars are stored for every classification
decision that is made. Therefore, a reasonable alternative might
have been to add successive test items to declarative memory
once decisions on them had been made. Although we did not
evaluate an alternative ACT-R model that incrementally added
test items to memory, we did, nevertheless explore the likely
impact that adding exemplar representations of classified test
items to declarative memory would have had for our pattern
of modeling results. Specifically, we conducted an analysis that
compared the mean similarity of test items for each condition
across the entire set of test items with that across the set
of training examples. The resultant values characterize the
(asymptotic) information present within the test items were these
to be classified accurately.
Figure 5 shows the normalized mean similarity scores for
each experimental condition across the set of training examples
and the set of test items. As expected, across the training
examples (Figure 5A) there is a difference in similarity between
the high- and low-similarity conditions, regardless of rule
compliance (i.e., compliant high-similarity and non-compliant
high-similarity have greater similarity score than compliant low-
similarity and non-compliant low-similarity). By design, the test
items factorially combined rule compliance and non-compliance
with high- and low-similarity to the initial training exemplars,
with each category present in equal number. It is consequently
no surprise that if we calculate similarity scores by comparing
individual test items to the entire set of test items (Figure 5D),
there is no such difference between the high- and low-similarity
conditions. Therefore, adding the test set in entirety does not, on
average, alter the similarities set up by the training items. Hence,
even if the model stored exemplar representations of the classified
test items, this would not systematically alter the effect of paying
attention to similarity.
There are further concerns to the idea of adding test items
to memory. One of the main barriers is that a categorization
label would need to be associated with each test item in memory.
In the unsupervised version of the task (Experiment 1 of Hahn
et al., 2010) the only way for the model to label an item would be
based on its own category decision. However, as Figure 2 clearly
shows the model makes many classification errors when using the
exemplar-route because of the way that category membership was
designed to be orthogonal to similarity; the above analysis shows
that this persists even when test items are added. As a result,
the assigned category label would be incorrect most of the time–
many items that were not category members would be incorrectly
added to memory as positive instances of the category. This in
turn would lead to the model making even more classification
errors when using the exemplar-route, and so failing to fit the
human data.
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FIGURE 5 | Mean similarity of test items for each condition to (A–C) training items and (D–F) test items across varying weight allocations to stimulus
features.
A final concern reflects the nature of the ACT-R activation
equation. Even if training items had been added to memory,
they would unlikely have been used. This is because at the
start of the experiment only the training exemplars would be in
memory. Each time one of these training exemplars is retrieved
from memory it would receive a boost in base-level activation,
reflecting the recency and frequency of usage. Critically, this
base-level activation would likely operate to make these training
exemplars dominate over the less frequently used test items.
Feature Weighting
A broader concern with generalizing these results to other
exemplar-based models is that the implementation of Nosofsky
and Palmeri’s (1997) EBRW model taken here assumes that
attention is equally distributed between stimuli features when
forming a classification judgment. This assumption of equal
weights is not commonly held across exemplar theories (e.g.,
Nosofsky, 1988, 1992; Kruschke, 1993), which instead allow for
greater weight to be given to diagnostically relevant stimuli
features. As mentioned above, an exemplar model with optimal
attention weights would be identical, in terms of classification
behavior, to the rule – this is because the features that are specified
in the rule are the only features that are important for the
classification task and so are the features that would come to be
weighted more saliently.
It might still be the case though that there are other non-
optimal sets of weights, other than equal weighting, that might
give rise to better fits between model and data. To explore this
issue, we conducted analyses of the effect of differential feature
weighting on mean similarity.
Figure 5 indicates the way additional weight to the rule-
relevant features changes similarity measures across conditions.
We consider first the standard case where only training items are
included as reference points. As expected given the design of the
materials, Figure 5A shows that when all feature dimensions are
given equal weighting, the high-similarity test items (compliant
high-similarity and non-compliant high-similarity) are more
similar to the training items than the low similarity test items
(compliant low-similarity and non-compliant low-similarity).
Because these similarity manipulations are orthogonal to rule
membership, judgments formed based on exemplar similarity to
training items would be at chance. In contrast, if a match along
a rule-relevant feature is heavily weighted (i.e., given ×10 the
weight, as in Figure 5C), then the difference between items in the
high-similarity (compliant high-similarity and non-compliant
high-similarity) and low-similarity (compliant low-similarity and
non-compliant low-similarity) conditions disappears because
exemplars now approximate the rule. Values in between these
two extreme points give rise to blends of both properties. For
instance, Figure 5B gives twice the weight to rule features as to
non-rule features. While this leads to a small difference between
items in the high-similarity (compliant high-similarity and non-
compliant high-similarity) and low-similarity (compliant low-
similarity and non-compliant low-similarity) conditions, it also
provides some information about category membership. Such an
intermediate blend, in effect, mirrors the aggregate behavior of
our hybrid ACT-R model that sometimes uses the rule route (i.e.,
that uses only the rule-relevant features) and sometimes uses
the exemplar route (i.e., that gives each feature equal weight).
In other words, the size of any exemplar-similarity effect in this
task is necessarily associated with classification errors, even when
differential feature weights are allowed.
The same conclusion, finally, emerges from consideration
of the resultant similarities if all items, not just the training
items, are considered. Consideration of Figures 5D–F reveals
that differential weights have no benefit whatsoever here, as the
essential difference between high- and low-similarity conditions
is never observed. This further supports the above contention
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that nothing would be gained by incrementally adding test items
to declarative memory.
In summary, we can therefore be confident that our results
do not rest on the particular choices that were made in our
modeling work about exemplar storage and exemplar weighting.
At the heart of the model’s difficulties lies the fact that attention
to similarity is detrimental to categorization accuracy by virtue
of stimulus design. A focus on accuracy necessarily drives down
attention to non-rule features, whether through use of the rule
route or through feature weighting, which in turn means the
similarity effects will go away, with the model failing to fit the
data as a result. The features on which the similarity manipulation
rests are irrelevant by design, neither differential weighting nor
adding exemplars to memory can alter this.
Other Models
Although we have chosen to focus on the Anderson and
Betz (2001) categorization model, it is worth considering
other prominent categorization models in the literature and
highlighting some of the challenges that they may face in
accounting for the pattern of results found by Hahn et al. (2010).
The dataset described here would seem to be equally
problematic for the model of Ashby et al. (1998, see also, Ashby
and Ell, 2002; Ashby and Casale, 2005). This model conflicts with
the results of Hahn et al.’s (2010) two experiments both because
of its route interaction and because the exemplar similarity effects
that Hahn et al. observe cannot readily be recast in the decision-
bound framework of the model.
Ashby et al.’s (1998) model assumes the existence of two
fundamentally distinct systems on which classification can be
based. One of these is an implicit (procedural) system, the other
is a system based on verbal (or verbalizable) rules. As the model’s
name COVIS (competition between verbal and implicit systems)
indicates, the two systems are assumed to be in competition, with
initial dominance of the verbal system. The concept of verbal rule
is operationalized roughly as “any strategy that can be described
verbally” (Ashby et al., 1998, p. 445). In the model, such rules
are translated into decision-bounds. The explicit, experimenter-
provided rules of Hahn et al. (2010) are not just verbalizable,
but can also be readily translated into a decision boundary in
the multi-dimensional space of their stimulus materials, as we
demonstrate shortly.
The first problem for the COVIS model, as defined by
Ashby et al. (1998), is that the similarity effect observed
in Hahn et al. (2010), which must be mediated by the
implicit system, should never arise because the rule is perfectly
predictive. As Ashby et al. (1998, pp. 458) state: “A fundamental
assumption of COVIS is that in learning of some new category
structure, there is a large initial bias in favor of the verbal
system. The implicit system can overcome this bias only if
it is reinforced at a higher rate than the verbal system over
some reasonably long number of trials.” However, there is no
reinforcement for the implicit system, because the rule in all
experiments is entirely predictive. The implicit system should
thus not become operative in the context of Hahn et al.’s
Experiments 1 and 3, and hence the similarity effects are left
unexplained.
Furthermore, the nature of the implicit system as proposed
by Ashby et al. (1998) seems unable to account for the specific
similarity effects that Hahn et al. (2010) observe. In characterizing
the nature of the implicit component of their model, Ashby et al.
(1998, p. 445) considered both decision-bound and exemplar-
theory as possible alternatives, but decided in favor of a decision-
bound approach.
In the Hahn et al. (2010) experiments that have been the focus
of the modeling efforts in the present paper, test items that were
high in similarity to the initial training examples were responded
to more quickly and more accurately. In order for a decision-
bound model to explain this effect, the difference between
high- and low-similarity items must translate into respective
differences in distance from the decision-bound. This idea has
been developed in previous debate between decision-bound
and exemplar theorists in the wider categorization literature
in order to explain (non-rule-based) studies which found that
exemplars high in similarity to other exemplars are responded to
more accurately and quickly (e.g., Ashby et al., 1994; Lamberts,
1995, 2000; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997). One explanation of
these findings assumes responses are faster because of similarity
to previous exemplars (Lamberts, 1995, 2000; Nosofsky and
Palmeri, 1997). By contrast, decision-bound theory, which
eschews the representation of individual exemplars, has claimed
that it is distance from the decision-bound that is responsible
for these effects (see, Ashby et al., 1994): high typicality items
can be responded to more quickly because they are farther
from the category’s decision-bound. The studies in question have
been inconclusive with regards to this issue, because exemplar
similarity and distance from the decision-bound have correlated.
However, by design these two aspects are dissociated in Hahn
et al.’s materials.
Hahn et al.’s (2010) high- and low-similarity test items differ
in similarity to the training exemplars, but they do not differ
in their distance from the category’s decision-bound. As noted
above, the simple rule used in the two studies that we model
here specified three necessary and sufficient features for category
membership. Namely, an item was a category member if “it has
an upside-down triangle at the sides, a cross in the center, and
a curly line at the top.” Figure 1 provides an illustration of
the accompanying items, showing both a high-similarity rule-
compliant item (a) and a low similarity compliant item (b).
As can be seen the materials were not based on differences
along continuous valued dimensions, as in previous contrasts
between exemplar- and decision-bound models, but rather on
discrete, substitutive features (on this contrast more generally
see e.g., Tversky, 1977); most importantly, however, the rule
makes reference to the values of only some of these features.
Why this decouples exemplar similarity and distance from the
decision-bound is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6A shows a single dimension of variation, where, for
example, a value of 1 corresponds to a triangle at the side, and
a value of 0 represents a circle. A rule for category membership
that says things are A’s only if they have a triangle at the side (i.e.,
a value of 1) corresponds to a decision-bound like the horizontal
line. This bound separates the members of the category, items
above the line, from the non-members below. As can be seen from
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FIGURE 6 | Decision-bound (dotted line) in a category space of binary-valued materials (A). The corners correspond to the possible exemplars. As can be
seen, adding in additional, irrelevant, non-rule dimensions in (B,C) does not alter the distance to the decision-bound. However, the irrelevant dimensions can be
used for manipulating similarity. Of the four corners above the decision-bound in (C), item 0,1,0 is less similar to item 1,1,1 than are the remaining two items, with
degree of similarity represented by gray scale in the illustration.
Figures 6B,C, adding in additional rule-irrelevant dimensions
(which would correspond to additional parts, or other attributes
such as color) does not alter the location of this decision-bound.
However, given enough additional, irrelevant dimensions, a
similarity manipulation that is orthogonal to the decision-bound
(i.e., the rule) becomes possible. For instance, in Figure 6C, one
might present item 1,1,1 as a training exemplar. The further
items “0,1,0,” “0,1,1,” and “1,1,0” could then be presented as novel
test items. All are members of the category (they are above the
decision-bound) and all are equally distant from the decision-
bound. However, they are not equally distant, and with that
similar, to each other. The item “0,1,0” is less similar to the
training item (item “1,1,1”) than are the other two (items “0,1,1”
and “1,1,0”), because it shares fewer dimension values (i.e., there
is only one common value as opposed to two).
In Hahn et al.’s (2010) materials, the similarity relations
among the rule compliant items are likewise based entirely
on the rule-irrelevant dimension, which leaves distance to
the decision-bound unaltered. Hence the observed increase in
reaction times for the high-similarity items cannot be explained
in terms of distance from the decision-bound. This also means
that our results are evidence against decision-bound models
of categorization in general (e.g., Ashby et al., 1994; see also
Nosofsky, 1991; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997 for further evidence
in form of typicality and frequency effects), not just COVIS with
its decision-bound component.
Of course, it is typically possible for models and theories
to accommodate conflicting results through further, additional
assumptions; however, such assumptions must have some
independent justification. One possibility suggested to us was that
decision-bound models could readily accommodate our results
by assuming that there is more noise in processing the feature
instantiations of the low similarity items. However, some further
explanation seems required, both as to why noise would have just
the right effect on reaction times, accuracy and ratings, and as
to why there should be more noise associated with these features
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in the first place. Because the features themselves are unrelated
to the decision-bound, it is entirely unclear how even systematic
noise would lead to the observed range of systematic effects on
classification decisions. Given that the only characteristic of these
features is that they are not those of the initial exemplars, it seems
likely that alternative explanations will simply be introducing
exemplars through the back door.
In summary, to accommodate our results, COVIS would seem
to need to adopt an exemplar component and provide a different
specification of how it interacts with the explicit, verbal route.
Finally, there are a few other hybrid models in the literature
that are worth mentioning. The most prominent of these
is Erickson and Kruschke’s (1998) ATRIUM model. It is a
connectionist implementation of a rule module and an exemplar
module, which is based directly on Kruschke’s (1992) ALCOVE,
whose outputs are combined into an overall response via
a gating mechanism that weights the predictions of each
module. The materials used in Hahn et al.’s (2010) study
present a different challenge to this model. The model is
designed for categorization tasks involving so-called contrastive,
or complementary, categories. In such tasks, there are two
competing categories, say A and B, such that anything that is not
an A is a B and vice versa, and the task is to learn to distinguish
the two. Hahn et al., however, used a different category structure
in that the three-feature rule highlighted above could be violated
in many ways. Non-members simply fail to possess one of the
rule-prescribed features, but there are many alternative ways
in which each individual rule requirement can be broken, and
these can, of course, also be combined. There is thus not a
coherent alternative category in Hahn et al.’s materials other than
whether the test items conform or not to the explicit rule. This
structure was chosen because real world rules typically do not
involve contrastive categories. For example, the criminal code
contains a rule that forbids the offense of theft. The rule specifies
theft through a positive characterization or description of what
constitutes it. By contrast, the behaviors that are not theft are
not delimited and, consequently are not given (and do not need)
any specification. Moreover, such a non-contrastive structure has
the methodological advantage of avoiding potential ambiguities
about whether participants are searching for A features or B
features in determining their response (see also Nosofsky et al.,
1989). In its present form, ATRIUM has competing rule nodes
within its rule component. It would thus require architectural
modification in order to be at all applicable to the category
structures used in the design of Experiments 1 and 3 of Hahn et al.
Even if we set aside the basic issue that ATRIUM requires
contrastive categories, it is also unclear how and why a gating
mechanism such as that specified in Erickson and Kruschke’s
model would allow the model to factor in exemplar information.
The rule route is itself entirely predictive, whereas the exemplar-
route is not, and in the data from Experiment 3 of Hahn et al.
(2010), participants receive constant feedback to that effect.
It is hence unclear how a model based entirely around error
correction could come to predict the sustained exemplar effects
observed in Hahn et al.’s dataset. The same limitation, we believe,
also applies to other connectionist hybrid models in the literature
(e.g., Noelle and Cottrell, 1996, 2000).
Beyond hybrid models of categorization, finally, it may be
tempting to assume that there are other general modeling
frameworks that provide a ready-made solution to modeling
these data. Drift diffusion models (DDM), for example, provide
a general, and in many cases optimal, framework for two
alternative forced choice tasks (see e.g., Bogacz et al., 2006).
The binary classification decision faced by participants in the
Hahn et al. (2010) task which involves a ‘yes’/‘no’ response on
category membership would seem to fit that classification. In
fact, the EBRW’s implements the discrete equivalent of a drift
diffusion model (see Bogacz et al., 2006). This, in effect, answers
the question concerning the applicability of DDM models to this
task: the EBRW can fit the data reported here no more than the
hybrid model containing it as a sub-component can. Exemplar
similarity is non-diagnostic in this task and the ‘evidence’ –
exemplar similarity – relies on rule irrelevant features, which by
definition, are irrelevant to the task. This fundamental design
feature of the Hahn et al. test set is what provides robust evidence
for non-optimality in the resultant categorization decisions of
participants. By the same token this design feature scuppers any
model that will provide optimal category decisions at the present
level of task reconstruction: the optimal behavior given a perfectly
predictive rule is simply to use that perfectly predictive rule.
This leaves open the fundamental question of why human
categorization is not optimal in this way, even though such
optimality has been widely assumed. Answering this question will
likely require a deeper understanding of visual attention, as Hahn
et al. (2010) note. There are results within the literature on visual
attention that involve exemplar effects. These studies suggest
intriguing parallels for further examination. Specifically, these
studies involve exemplar effects that seem relevant to the task of
search for category relevant features in the first place. The first
set of studies of interest stems from Chun and Jiang (1998, 1999)
‘contextual cuing’ paradigm. Directly relevant to the Hahn et al.
task examined here is Experiment 1 of Chun and Jiang (1999).
In this task, participants were presented with a visual search
task that involved entirely novel objects as target and distractors.
Participants either always saw the target object paired with the
same distractors or paired with different displays of distractors,
with overall exposure to a given ensemble of distractors held
constant. Participants were faster with the consistent pairings,
suggesting that the distractors primed the identity of the target
object. Chun and Jiang (1998) also found evidence to suggest that
target location could be primed in the same way. Interestingly,
explicit memory regarding the target and distractor-display
pairings was entirely at chance. Participants could not reliably
distinguish between old and new contexts for a target. In other
words, exemplar effects may be integral to categorization, because
they are integral to establishing the presence or absence of the
component features of the to-be-classified items.
An entirely different second study conducted by DeSchepper
and Treisman (1996) supports this point. These authors found
a negative priming effect for the unattended of two overlapping
shapes after a single exposure. This negative priming effect could
last, without decrement, across 200 intervening trials and across
delays up to a month. Again, participants had no explicit memory
of these shapes and were at chance in recognition, despite the
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robust priming effects, again suggesting a dissociation of implicit
and explicit memory (see also Shacter et al., 1990). In other words,
we suspect that exemplar similarity plays the role it does in the
Hahn et al. (2010) experiments because exemplars are relevant to
feature detection itself. By the same token, what has no utility at
the level of classification in the Hahn et al. studies may have utility
at the level of feature detection.
Hence, we think that what the model failures demonstrated in
the present paper ultimately show, is that categorization behavior
cannot really be understood without more detailed engagement
with visual attention and feature recognition.
CONCLUSION
It is hard to imagine a more appropriate task on which to test
hybrid models of categorization than that used in Hahn et al.
(2010) given that participants receive perfectly predictive, simple
classification rules at the start of the task. The low error rates
observed by Hahn et al. suggest these rules were successfully used
by participants to categorize novel test items. At the same time,
their data also show clear effects of an independent exemplar-
similarity manipulation: Participants were faster at classifying
novel test items that shared features, which were irrelevant to
the categorization task, with items that were seen during an
initial training stage in the experiment. Nevertheless, the hybrid
model tested here, which combines Nosofsky et al. (1989) EBRW
and RULEX models within the ACT-R cognitive architecture
struggled to capture the behavioral data. Exploration of the
model’s parameter space revealed that it was possible to generate
very good quantitative fits for both the error rate and reaction
time data from an unsupervised version of Hahn et al.’s task.
But providing feedback about the accuracy of categorization
judgments in a supervised version of the task revealed a critical
weakness of the model because it predicted that the size of the
exemplar-similarity effect should diminish over time as feedback
demonstrates that paying attention to similarity is not a reliable
cue to guide categorization judgments. The reason why the
model predicts that the effect of instance-similarity diminishes
over successive trials is quite clear: Exemplar-similarity effects
are brought about through the use of the model’s exemplar-
route. However, because the exemplar-route leads to frequent
categorization errors, its utility is strategically lowered, which
results in it being chosen less often. In contrast, the rule route,
which does not give rise to any effect of instance-similarity, has
its utility strategically increased because its use leads to correct
judgments.
By the same token, all hybrid models we examined are
challenged by these data because all of them assume that the
relative influence of rule and exemplar processes is influenced
by their utility. Moreover, the difficulties are compounded in the
remaining models we examined because utility in these models
would seem to reduce entirely to classification accuracy.
The idea of hybrid models remains attractive in principle
(see also Hahn and Chater, 1998), but they do not yet seem
sufficiently well-matched to actual behavior in practice. At the
same time, there is evidence from a neural level for separable rule-
and similarity-based processes in both categorization (see e.g.,
Folstein and van Petten, 2004; Koenig et al., 2005) and judgment
(see recently e.g., von Helversen et al., 2014). However, exemplar
similarity seems likely to be relevant not just to decisions about
category membership itself, but also to the identification of
category relevant features in the first place. Reconsideration
of how and why rules and exemplars might computationally
combine thus seems a pressing matter if human categorization
behavior is to be fully understood.
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